Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 24

Issue 2

Article 2

2019

The Evolution of Private Equity and the Change in General Partner
Compensation Terms in the 1980s
Stephen Fraidin
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft

Meredith Foster
J.D. Yale, 2018

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Administration, Management, and
Operations Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative
Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen Fraidin & Meredith Foster, The Evolution of Private Equity and the Change in General Partner
Compensation Terms in the 1980s, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 321 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE
CHANGE IN GENERAL PARTNER
COMPENSATION TERMS IN THE 1980S
Stephen Fraidin* & Meredith Foster**
ABSTRACT
While the business model of private equity has remained largely
unchanged since the 1980s, private equity as an industry has
undergone a dramatic transformation. In the early 1980s, private
equity was both highly profitable and highly controversial. Today, on
the other hand, it is an important asset class and its returns are modest.
This paper will document both of these changes and identify the
several factors that contributed simultaneously to private equity’s
declining profitability and to its increasing public acceptance. This
paper will also identify another change that private equity underwent
in the 1980s, which has been largely ignored: the change in how
private equity fund managers are compensated. The change in
manager compensation had a material impact on the industry. While
heralded as unequivocally positive for private equity investors, these
compensation terms created new agency costs between investors and
private equity managers and contributed to the increasing significance
of fixed compensation in private equity.
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INTRODUCTION
Private equity funds, such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR)
and Forstmann Little, first entered public consciousness in the late 1970s.1
While the business model has remained largely the same, private equity
today is very different from what it was during the 1970s and 1980s. Most

1. See WALTER KIECHEL III, THE LORDS OF STRATEGY: THE SECRET INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY OF THE NEW CORPORATE WORLD 5 (2010). See also Our Firm—Firm History,
KKR, http://www.kkr.com/our-firm/firm-history [https://perma.cc/DA3Q-WBNY] (last
visited May 15, 2019); Adam Lashinsky, How Teddy Forstmann Lost His Groove,
FORTUNE (July 26, 2004), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_
archive/2004/07/26/377149/index.htm [https://perma.cc/JVG8-3M79].
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evidently, private equity has transformed from a niche investment
strategy to an asset class and industry. In 1980, there were only about
fourteen leveraged buyout funds.2 Today, there are thousands of private
equity funds internationally, with the number having doubled from 2004
to 2014.3 As of June 2016, private equity funds managed a total of about
$2.49 trillion in assets.4
Not only has the private equity industry grown significantly, but its
profitability and reputation also have changed since its earliest days. In
the 1980s, private equity was both highly controversial5 and highly
profitable.6 Frequently, in the 1980s, it was described as excessively risky,
illogical, and bad for the economy.7 The president of Chemical Bank, for
example, wrote in 1985 that he worried leveraged buyouts were “simply
. . . a perverse result of greed and not a logical, rational thing.”8 While the
private equity industry remains the subject of criticism—most notably,

2. See E-mail from Caroline Teleisha, Client Services Executive, Preqin, to
Meredith Foster, Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Sept. 25, 2017, 16:41 EST)
(on file with author).
3. See Number of Active PE Firms up 143% Since 2000: A Global Breakdown,
PITCHBOOK (June 10, 2015), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/number-of-active-pefirms-up-143-since-2000-a-global-breakdown [https://perma.cc/8GYH-MD4B].
4. See PREQIN, 2017 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL
REPORT 17 (2017), http://docs.preqin.com/samples/2017-Preqin-Global-Private_Equityand-Venture-Capital-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FX6E-X2JB]
[hereinafter 2017 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT].
5. See, e.g., Fred R. Bleakley, S.E.C. Chief Cautions on Leveraged Buyouts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 8, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/08/business/sec-chief-cautions
-on-leveraged-buyouts.html [https://perma.cc/R9K7-DJ4A]; G. Christian Hill & John D.
Williams, Buyout Boom: Leveraged Purchases of Firms Keep Gaining Despite Rising
Risks, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 29, 1983, at 1; Leonard Silk, The Peril Behind the Takeover
Boom, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/29/business/theperil-behind-the-takeover-boom.html [https://perma.cc/DX5V-EBCD]; Leslie Wayne,
Buyouts Altering Face of Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 1985), https://www.
nytimes.com/1985/11/23/business/buyouts-altering-face-of-corporate-america.html
[https://perma.cc/VUU3-W733].
6. See Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, How Do Private
Equity Investments Perform Compared to Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 20
(2016).
7. See sources cited supra note 5.
8. Silk, supra note 5.
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when Mitt Romney ran for President in 20129—today, it is not only much
less controversial, but also frequently celebrated as an ideal investment
strategy.10 Many of the disastrous effects that analysts predicted private
equity would cause have not come to fruition.11 In addition, many key
insights of private equity funds regarding management compensation
incentives and disciplinary effects of debt are now textbook in the
business community.12 As an illustration of its institutional acceptance, in
2017, Preqin reported that “[eighty-four percent] of investors have a
positive perception of private equity, the greatest proportion among
alternative asset classes.”13
Yet, as private equity has become more mainstream, its average
returns have declined significantly. Although the average returns of
private equity funds net-of-fees in the early 1980s far exceeded the returns
of the market, Steven Kaplan and Antoinette Schoar in 2005 found that

9. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Annie Lowrey, As Romney Advances, Private Equity
Becomes Part of the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012
/01/11/business/as-romney-campaign-advances-private-equity-becomes-part-of-thedebate.html [https://perma.cc/89EX-4V4G]; Simon Meads & Greg Roumeliotis, Buyout
Firms Struggle To Repair Image Under Romney Spotlight, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2012),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-privateequity-image/buyout-firms-struggle-torepair-image-under-romney-spotlight-idUSTRE8201AG20120301
[https://perma.cc/
2W98-KW2L]; Gary Rivlin, Bain Capital Stays Quiet Amid Attacks on Mitt Romney,
Private Equity, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.thedailybeast .com/baincapital-stays-quiet-amid-attacks-on-mitt-romney-private-equity [https://perma.cc/JCG7QSYA].
10. The high returns of Yale’s endowment, for example, are attributed in large part
to the “immensely successful private equity program.” John Barber, Maestro of Private
Equity, IPE (Feb. 2001), https://www.ipe.com/maestro-of-private-equity/13929.article
[https://perma.cc/M4CM-XUHN].
11. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private
Equity, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 1, 9 (2008) (finding that the annual default rate of leveraged
buyouts is 1.2 percent, less than the “average default rate of 1.6 percent that Moody’s
reports for all U.S. corporate bond issuers” during that period).
12. See SHINICHI HIROTA, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE IN STAKEHOLDER
SOCIETY: BEYOND SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM 94-95 (2015); Andreas Beroutsos,
Andrew Freeman & Conor F. Kehoe, What Public Companies Can Learn From Private
Equity, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2007), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/what-public-companies-canlearn-from-private-equity [https://perma.cc/H4XJ-ZV2S].
13. 2017 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT, supra note
4, at 16.
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leveraged buyout funds raised after 1986, “weighted by committed
capital” and net-of-fees, have, on average, not “outperform[ed] the S&P
500.”14 Chris Higson and Rüdiger Stucke, using a different dataset, found
that buyout funds from vintage years since 1980 “have outperformed the
S&P 500,” but that there has been a “significant downward trend in
absolute returns over all twenty-nine vintage years.”15
This paper will tell the story of how private equity evolved from
controversial and extraordinarily profitable to an accepted asset class and
much less profitable. It will discuss the factors that affected the private
equity industry in the 1980s that led to each of these changes, particularly
the steep decline in private equity returns.
This paper also will identify another important change to the private
equity industry that occurred around the late 1980s which the academic
literature has largely ignored: the change in the way incentive
compensation was calculated.16 In an attempt to better align the incentives
of fund managers and investors, institutional investors requested that
private equity compensation terms change to be theoretically more
investor-friendly and to eliminate certain conflicts of interest faced by
fund managers.17 The most important change was the evolution from a
deal-by-deal calculation of carried interest to the aggregation method,
which requires that profits and losses across individual portfolio deals be

14. Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns,
Persistence, and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791, 1801-02, 1821 (2005) (“LBO funds
exhibit almost the reverse pattern with substantial IRRs and PMEs greater than [one] in
the first half of the 1980s, followed by relatively poor performance in the first half of the
1990s. For funds raised from 1987 to 1994, the average PME of LBO funds exceeds 1.00
only in [one] year, 1990”); see also Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The
Performance of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1747, 1774 (2009) (finding
this for both buyout and venture capital funds). But see Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson
& Steven N. Kaplan, Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?, 69 J. Fin. 1851,
1852 (2014) (“Our results are markedly more positive for buyout funds than previously
documented with commercial data sets.”).
15. Chris Higson & Rüdiger Stucke, The Performance of Private Equity 2-3 (Mar.
2, 2012) (Working Paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009
067 [https://perma.cc/WC7L-JLFR].
16. See WILLIAM M. MERCER, KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTING 7 (1996).
17. See id.
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aggregated before a general partner (GP), the manager of the fund, is
allowed to receive incentive compensation.18
We argue that although this change in GP compensation is seemingly
positive for investors and designed to deal with one agency cost problem,
it has had several negative effects for private equity fund investors. First,
the aggregation method may have been damaging to private equity longterm returns due to unacknowledged incentives that it created. While
fixing some agency costs between managers and investors, these new
compensation terms inadvertently created others that may be worse. Not
only did these terms create new, arguably more significant agency costs,
but they also created significant organizational issues for private equity
managers. The principal organizational issue involves the management
company’s attraction and retention of employees, including investment
analysts. Finally, as the amount that GPs could receive in incentive
compensation declined, the importance of fixed portions (i.e., those not
sensitive to performance) of GP compensation has grown. Today, “about
two-thirds of the expected revenue” for venture capital and leveraged
buyout funds “comes from fixed-revenue components.”19 What this
means is that one of the key features of private equity compensation
structures—that it creates high-powered incentives for GPs to make
profitable investments—largely does not exist today. Instead, the primary
incentive of private equity fund managers is to focus on increasing their
assets under management.
This paper will conclude then with a discussion of how, in light of
the various negative effects of the adoption of the aggregation method of
calculating carried interest, GP compensation terms could be revised to
mitigate such effects.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses two of the key
changes in private equity from the 1980s to today. In particular, we
discuss the initial controversy regarding private equity and how it evolved
into a celebrated investment strategy, as well as the factors that
contributed to the decline in returns. Part II then identifies another
important change that private equity funds underwent in the 1980s: the
change in how GPs were compensated and, in particular, how incentive
compensation was calculated. We argue that such a change, despite its
intended beneficial effects, likely has altered private equity in a way that
18.
19.

See id.
Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23
REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2305 (2010).

2019]

THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE EQUITY & THE
CHANGE IN GP COMPENSATION TERMS

327

is not unequivocally positive, and potentially has contributed to its
decreased profitability. Part III then discusses the implications of this
argument. Part IV concludes by assessing possible means to mitigate the
negative externalities associated with contemporary GP compensation
terms.
I. KEY CHANGES IN PRIVATE EQUITY (FROM
THE EARLY 1980S TO TODAY)
In this part, we define what private equity is and then detail two of
the most dramatic ways in which the industry has changed since the
1980s.
A. WHAT IS PRIVATE EQUITY?
1. Investment Process
The basic business model of private equity is to acquire majority
control of a business,20 which may be privately held, publicly held, or a
division or subsidiary of a public or private company (or companies).
Financing this transaction consists of a large amount of debt and a
relatively small amount of equity. The private equity fund privately owns
most of the equity of the company and increases its value through changes
to corporate governance and the company’s capital structure, active and
more focused management, freedom from public company regulation,
more efficient tax planning, and incentive compensation to managers. The
objective is to sell the company to another buyer, which is sometimes
another private equity fund, or to monetize the investment through an
initial public offering. Private equity funds will then repeat this
investment process, creating a portfolio of investments. By investing in a
20. While acquiring majority control of the company is often the goal for private
equity investments, private equity funds also frequently engage in PIPE investments in
companies. See BERNHARD SARVE, PIPE INVESTMENTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: THE
TEMPTATION OF PUBLIC EQUITY INVESTMENTS TO PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS 15 (2013).
PIPE investments generally involve the purchase of non-control equity positions in
companies. Id. at 39. Private equity firms also frequently purchase majority positions in
companies through consortiums, and therefore may not alone have majority control. See
Elizabeth M. Bailey, Are Private Equity Consortia Anticompetitive? The Economics of
Club Bidding, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2007, at 1.
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portfolio of companies, the fund is able to reduce its risk exposure for a
given level of return.21
To finance the equity portion of these deals, private equity funds use
money that has been contributed by the funds’ investors. Ordinarily, the
investors are institutional investors—such as university endowments,
sovereign wealth funds, and corporate or state pension funds22—who
commit the equity capital, which fund managers then utilize for equity
commitments to proposed transactions. To set the terms of their
relationship, the investors and managers enter into a detailed limited
partnership agreement or other type of formation agreement.23 Generally,
the agreement requires that if a manager identifies a transaction, the
investors will contribute up to a fixed amount of money—generally called
committed capital.24 The investor is then given a relatively short time—
typically no more than a month—to wire money, which the private equity
fund will use to fund the equity portion of that transaction.25 Certain banks
now finance the limited partner investment.26 This has the dual positive
effect of increasing the rate of return to the investor, and the investor need
not provide his or her own money unless the investment loses money. In
addition, it increases the certainty that the limited partner contribution will
be made. The investor generally will not be able to refuse to make its

21. For a more extensive discussion of portfolio theory, see generally PORTFOLIO
THEORY AND MANAGEMENT (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck, eds., 2013); Harry
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
22. See Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar & Wan Wongsunwai, Smart Institutions,
Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 732 (2007).
23. See Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259,
262-65 (2010).
24. See GUY FRASER-SAMPSON, PRIVATE EQUITY AS AN ASSET CLASS 18 (2nd ed.
2010); see, e.g., Second Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership,
APOLLO INVESTMENT FUND VIII, L.P. 1, 25-26 (2013), https://nakedcapitalism.net/LPAs/
verified-as-LPAs/Apollo_Investment_Fund_VIII_LPA_S1.pdf [https://perma.cc/25MLSCKZ] [hereinafter Apollo Limited Partnership Agreement]; Amended and Restated
Agreement of Limited Partnership, BLACKSTONE CAPITAL PARTNERS V L.P. 1, 31-34
(2005),
https://nakedcapitalism.net/LPAs/verified-as-LPAs/BlackstoneV_searchable
.pdf [https://perma.cc/E89Y-XGLM] [hereinafter Blackstone Limited Partnership
Agreement].
25. See, e.g., Apollo Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 24, at 25-26;
Blackstone Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 24, at 31-34.
26. See Lerner, Schoar & Wongsunwai, supra note 22, at 732.
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contribution even if it disapproves of the investment.27 However, the fund
will excuse investors that are prohibited from investing in certain
industries, such as tobacco, from contributing to the equity portion of the
transaction if the transaction involves an investment in one of those
industries.28
The majority of private equity funds are limited partnerships or other
pass-through entities.29 These entities have a finite life of, typically, ten
years with a possible one- to three-year extension.30 At the end of the life
of the fund, the manager, or the GP, stops being paid a management fee,
and any remaining investments are liquidated. The basic fee structure for
GPs, which has remained relatively stable over time, is a so-called
management fee of two percent of committed capital and twenty percent
of profits, which is termed “carried interest” or incentive compensation.31
The twenty percent carry fee is generally subject to an eight percent
hurdle rate compounded per annum, which prevents the GP from
collecting the success-based fee unless the investors or the limited
partners (LPs) first receive a minimum threshold rate of return.32 If the
returns exceed the hurdle rate, GPs generally are then allowed to receive
one hundred percent of future returns through a catch-up provision until

27. See, e.g., Apollo Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 24, at 27-28;
Blackstone Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 24, at 56.
28. See, e.g., Apollo Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 24, at 29.
29. See Ingo Stoff & Reiner Braun, The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms
Beyond 2 and 20, 26 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65, 65 (2014). Because the vast majority of
private equity funds are limited partnerships, this paper, for purposes of simplicity,
discusses private equity firms and their organizational structure as if they were all limited
partnerships. Accordingly, we use the terms “limited partner” and “general partner”
throughout the paper to describe the investors and management of these funds. It is
important to note that recently some of the largest private equity funds like KKR have
become corporations. See Joshua Franklin, Private Equity Firm KKR Opts to Become CCorp After U.S. Tax Reform, REUTERS (May 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-kkr-results/private-equity-firm-kkr-to-convert-to-a-corporation-after-u-s-tax-reformidUSKBN1I4164 [https://perma.cc/EBP2-ZSRR].
30. See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 11, at 3; Stoff & Braun, supra note 29, at
66; see also Jennifer Bollen, Average Private Equity Fund Life Span Exceeds 13 Years,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/03/31/averageprivate-equity-fund-life-span-exceeds-13-years/ [https://perma.cc/G4E7-AANP].
31. See Stoff & Braun, supra note 29, at 65.
32. See id.
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they have received the agreed-upon twenty percent of the fund’s overall
returns.33
Exactly when the GPs receive carried interest payments varies based
on whether the fund uses a European or American “waterfall.”34 A
waterfall determines the distribution of capital to the GPs and LPs. Under
the American waterfall, carried interest is distributed on a deal-by-deal
basis, although it is subject to a clawback provision upon liquidation that
ensures that the GPs do not receive more than twenty percent of the fund’s
aggregate returns.35 The European waterfall, on the other hand, withholds
carried interest until the fund achieves a specified benchmark return.36
While GPs should be paid the same dollar amount under both provisions,
the deal-by-deal provision under the American waterfall is considered
more GP-friendly because, although any excess returns will be clawed
back at the liquidation of the fund, the GP does not have to pay interest
on that amount.37 Thus, the GP effectively receives an interest-free loan
that must be repaid upon liquidation.38
Private equity funds, like other types of investment funds, are the
products of an organizational form that is described often as the
“separation of funds and managers.”39 Preexisting management
companies, such as Blackstone or KKR,40 establish private equity funds
and typically create new funds every three to five years.41 Although the
fund and the management company are legally distinct entities, they enter
into an agreement under which the management company agrees to
supply “operational and administrative services” to the fund and “gives
the management company sole authority to direct the fund’s operations
and investment strategy.”42

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 66.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Jarrod Shobe, Misaligned Interests in Private Equity, 2016 BYU L. REV.
1437, 1454-55 (2017).
38. See id. at 1463-64.
39. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014).
40. See id. at 1238-39.
41. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 19, at 2304.
42. Morley, supra note 39, at 1239.
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This organizational structure has two important implications for
private equity investors. First, investors, such as endowments and mutual
funds, generally invest in the funds rather than the management
companies and, therefore, do not have rights to share in the equity and
residual profits of the management companies.43 Second, investors have
no control over the management of those funds.44 The academic literature
has argued that, due to this absence of control, “extremely powerful
performance incentives” designed to encourage managers to act in the
best interests of investors are essential to help counteract the absence of
direct investor control and lack of robust exit rights.45
It is important to note that while academic literature often groups
together buyout funds and venture capital funds under the umbrella label
“private equity,”46 venture capital and private equity in the investment
community denote distinct modes of investment. For example, private
equity funds generally focus on established companies with predictable
cash flows, which permits interest coverage, whereas venture capital
funds focus on new, or relatively new, companies with high growth
potential and sometimes with no prior earnings.47 Private equity and
venture capital funds also differ in the ownership stakes they take in
companies, the method by which they finance their ownership stakes, the
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 1241.
See id. at 1241, 1243-57.
Id. at 1257; see also id. at 1241, 1243-57.
See, e.g., Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 14, at 1791 (“The private equity industry,
primarily venture capital (VC) and buyout (LBO) investments, has grown tremendously
over the last decade.”); Morley, supra note 39, at 1236 (“People sometimes refer to
‘private equity’ funds by other names that more specifically describe the funds’
investment strategies. ‘Venture capital’ funds, for example, tend to invest primarily in
companies that are relatively new and risky. ‘Buyout’ funds tend to buy large and
controlling stakes in a small number of established operating companies.”); Ludovic
Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1747, 1747 (2009) (drawing conclusions about the “the performance of private
equity funds both net-of-fees and gross-of-fees” based on datasets which include both
buyout and venture capital funds); David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do Private
Equity Fund Managers Earn Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow
Performance, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2760, 2763 (2013) (finding that “[p]rivate equity funds
that are higher cost in terms of fees and carry do not offer lower net-of-fee performance”
based on a sample of returns from buyout and venture capital funds).
47. See John R. M. Hand, What Drives the Top Line? Nonfinancial Determinants of
Sales Revenue in Private Venture-Backed Firms 2 (Dec. 28, 2005), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=872537 [https://perma.cc/QT88-3H5X].
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roles they play in the companies’ day-to-day operations, the industries in
which they invest, and their investment results.48 Nevertheless, both types
of funds compensate the manager with a fee based on committed funds
and a share of the profits of investments.49
While the above model of private equity funds has remained largely
constant since the 1980s, the industry has changed drastically. A number
of factors that took place during the late-1980s are responsible for these
changes.
B. PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE 1980S
1. Early Controversy
Almost as soon as early private funds became profitable, they
became the focus of intense public scrutiny. While some observers were
optimistic about leveraged buyout transactions, others were deeply
skeptical. Martin Lipton, a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz, wrote that private equity takeovers had “dangerous implications
for our economy” and were “driven by speculative, financial
considerations” rather than “intrinsic business considerations.”50 The New
York Times called them “a perverse result of greed and not a logical,
rational thing.”51 As Felix G. Rohatyn, a senior partner of Lazard,
declared in 1984: “[a]ll this frenzy may be good for investment bankers
now, but it [i]s not good for the country or investment bankers in the long
run. We seem to be living in a 1920’s, jazz age atmosphere.”52 Media
48. See Victor W. Hwang, What’s the Difference Between Private Equity and
Venture Capital?, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/victorhwang/
2012/10/01/presidential-debate-primer-whats-the-difference-between-private-equityand-venture-capital/#13deded43c45 [https://perma.cc/9YL4-DN2X].
49. See Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 14, at 1793.
50. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); see also Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 104 (1979) (“Whether the long-term interests of the
nation’s corporate system and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit
speculators interested not in the vitality and continued existence of the business enterprise
in which they have bought shares, but only in a quick profit on the sale of those shares?”).
51. Silk, supra note 5.
52. Fred R. Bleakley, Surge in Company Takeovers Causes Widespread Concern,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/03/business/surge-incompany-takeovers-causes-widespread-concern.html [https://perma.cc/EA92-MC8X].
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clippings from the early 1980s described leveraged buyouts “as financial
houses of cards that can quickly tumble down in the face of rising interest
rates and poor management practices,”53 like a “roulette wheel.”54 In
addition, many of the major New York law firms refused to represent
private equity funds.55
More specific criticisms of private equity in the early 1980s include
the issues discussed in turn.
a. Excessive Leverage
One of the most common critiques was that increasing the debt loads
would bankrupt such companies in the next financial downturn.56
Consequentially, the uptick in corporate bankruptcy filings caused by the
downturn would then amplify the effects of that financial downturn.57 In
1984, the Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman John Shad
warned that leveraged buyouts would lead to more corporate bankruptcies
and stated that “[t]he leveraging up of American enterprise . . . will
magnify the adverse consequences of the next recession or [lead to a]
significant rise in interest rates.”58
b. High Prices
A second related criticism, which arose from the eagerness to
participate in the leveraged buyout boom, was that the prices of many
companies purchased were bid too high.59 Because of such inflated
prices—and the massive amounts of debt used to finance these deals—
53.
54.
55.

Paul Engel, Bottom Fishing Catches On, INDUSTRY WK., June 1984, at 47.
Wayne, supra note 5.
James Langford, Richard Brand on Cadwalader’s Thriving Corporate Practice,
LAWDRAGON (Jan. 21, 2019), http://www.lawdragon.com/2019/01/21/richard-brand-oncadwaladers-thriving-corporate-practice/ [https://perma.cc/7AA4-QBTD].
56. See, e.g., Fred R. Bleakley, S.E.C. Chief Cautions on Leveraged Buyouts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 8, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/08/business/sec-chief-cautionson-leveraged-buyouts.html [https://perma.cc/TZ4A-YAT9]; Silk, supra note 5; Wayne,
supra note 5.
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. Bleakley, supra note 56 (quoting John S.R. Shad, chairman of the SEC).
59. See Daniel F. Cuff, Perils of Leveraged Finance: Large Loans Worry Banks,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/14/business/perils-ofleveraged-buyouts.html [https://perma.cc/ES98-96UV]; Hill & Williams, supra note 5.
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any change in the economics of the company or the economy at large
could bankrupt these companies.60
c. Low Prices
While some argued that the prices paid by private equity firms were
too high, others argued that the prices paid were artificially low and that
private equity firms essentially were expropriating from shareholders.61
Two rationales may explain why private equity firms could underpay for
companies. First, the stock market systemically underpriced companies.62
Second, corporate management—who teamed up with private equity
firms—used their positions as insiders to take advantage of
shareholders.63 Some suspected managers of capitalizing on their
positions as insider to buy companies at discounted rates.64 An example
used to support this belief was the 1983 leveraged buyout of Stokely-Van
Camp Inc., a food processing company.65 “Stokely’s management . . .
initially offered $50 a share for the company and later $55, but it then
rejected as too low a $62 bid by Pillsbury Co. Eventually, the food
processor was sold to Quaker Oats Co. for $77 a share,” $27 per share
more than the original bid.66
d. Morality
A related, but distinct, criticism was the moral concern over the
position in which leveraged buyouts placed management.67 In many of the
early, large leveraged buyout deals, private equity firms teamed up with

60.
61.

See Cuff, supra note 59.
See, e.g., Hill & Williams, supra note 5; Thomas P. Murphy, Boomlet in BuyOuts, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1976, at 100.
62. See Hill & Williams, supra note 5.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Linda Grant, Takeovers: Speculative Money Is Contributing to the
Craze as Concern Mounts Over Tactics and Shareholder Rights, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1984, at E1 (referencing the Stokely-Van Camp Inc. deal); Hill & Williams, supra note
5.
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senior management of the company being acquired.68 Often, senior
management received around ten percent of the post-transaction equity
for minimal cash investment.69 And, in many cases, management’s stake
was structured to require little or no cash payments.70 Thus, management
had the opportunity to acquire substantial wealth, on a favorable tax basis,
for helping the private equity firm acquire its company. In other words,
managers acted as buyers and fiduciaries of the sellers. Some believed
that management, when presented with this conflict of interest, used their
positions to further their own selfish interests.71 The press accused
management of using inside information to capitalize on low market
valuations, manipulating the company’s financials, and influencing
investment bank fairness opinions.72
e. Tax Transfer
Another criticism was that leveraged buyouts had few economic
benefits, aside from reducing a company’s taxes.73 Critics claimed that
leveraged buyouts did not create independent economic value and that
they were profitable largely due to subsidies provided by the Internal
Revenue Code.74 Such subsidies included the deductibility of interest and
the ability to attain “a stepped-up basis in [a] target’s assets,” allowing for
large depreciation deductions and tax-free disposition of these assets.75
Interest deductibility benefits leveraged companies by allowing them
to use pre-tax earnings to make interest payments, thereby reducing their
total taxable income.76 Because payments to equity holders, on the other
68. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS COMBINATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 214 (West ed., 2003); Dan R.
Dalton, The Ubiquitous Leveraged Buyout (LBO): Management Buyout or Management
Sellout?, 32 BUS. HORIZONS 36, 36 (1989).
69. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 68, at 37; Deborah A. DeMott, Introduction—The
Biggest Deal, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1989).
70. This occurrence is based on the authors’ observations.
71. See Hill & Williams, supra note 5.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Cuff, supra note 59; Grant, supra note 67; Allan Sloan, Luring Banks
Overboard?, FORBES, Apr. 9, 1984, at 39.
74. See Sloan supra note 73, at 39.
75. See Patricia L. Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1039,
1050, 1070 n. 115 (1987).
76. Id. at 1043.
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hand, must come from post-tax earnings, the more debt relative to equity
that a particular company has on its balance sheet, the lower that
company’s cost of capital should be. In this way, the tax subsidy
disproportionately benefits highly leveraged companies. Thus, in a
perfect world, a company could increase its returns to equity investors
purely by altering its debt to equity ratio.
Another subsidy in existence at the time—the ability to attain a
stepped-up basis on a target’s assets—also made private equity more
profitable.77 Companies that had assets with tax bases significantly below
their market price could be purchased through a leveraged buyout and
step-up the tax basis of their assets to the amount paid in the leveraged
buyout.78 A private equity fund could then take large depreciation
deductions on the new stepped-up basis of the assets, as well as sell parts
of a business without having to pay any—or only a marginal amount—in
taxes.79 Not only did this make leveraged buyouts more attractive, but it
also meant that conglomerates—whose various divisions could be sold to
pay off some of the overall debt tax-free—became prime targets for
leveraged buyouts.80
f. Short-termism
Leveraged buyouts also were said to force managers to focus on
short-term profits over the long-term value of the business.81 Companies
acquired through leveraged buyouts with large debt burdens would be
forced to generate immediate cash flows in order to make regular interest
payments.82 In addition, those companies not yet acquired through
leveraged buyouts were forced to take actions to generate immediate

77. See Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created or
Wealth Redistributed?, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, 46, 59
(Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W. Chilton, eds., 1988).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See MARK J. P. ANSON, HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATE ASSETS 432-434 (2002).
81. See, e.g., Opinion, Who’s Got the Leverage?, WALL. ST. J., June 21, 1984, at 34;
John S. R. Shad, The Leveraging of America, WALL. ST. J., June 8, 1984, at 1; Wayne,
supra note 5.
82. See Who’s Got the Leverage?, supra note 81.
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returns that would be reflected in their current stock price to prevent
becoming a takeover target in the future.83
g. Expropriation of Value from Creditors
Another criticism of leveraged buyouts involved the expropriation of
value from pre-transaction creditors and paying that value to
shareholders.84 Publicly traded debt of companies purchased through
leveraged buyouts suffered material declines in value when the leveraged
buyouts, which incurred substantially more debt, were announced.85
This criticism, however, quickly dwindled in 1989 after the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and other plaintiffs brought a
lawsuit to stop the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco on this basis.86 The
plaintiffs claimed that the value of their bonds decreased by millions of
dollars in response to “RJR Nabisco’s actions [which] drastically
impaired the value of bonds previously issued to plaintiffs by, in effect,
misappropriating the value of those bonds to help finance the LBO and to
distribute an enormous windfall to the company’s shareholders.”87
The court refused to stop the transaction, pointing out that MetLife,
and other pre-deal lenders, could protect themselves by including either
change-in-control provisions in the debt instruments or restrictions on the
company’s ability to raise additional debt,88 provisions that are now
standard in debt contracts. In other words, the court refused to imply
contractual terms not bargained for, especially given that the bondholders
were sophisticated market participants and fully aware when they bought
the debt that “RJR Nabisco strenuously opposed additional restrictive
covenants that might limit the incurrence of new debt or the company’s
ability to engage in a merger.”89
83. Cf. Shad, supra note 81, at 1 (“[U]nder current economic conditions,
conservatively capitalized companies—those with low debt-equity ratios—have great
incentive to borrow funds and reacquire their own shares or those of other companies,
rather than suffer the consequences of such tactics by others.”).
84. See Lehn & Poulsen, supra note 77, at 55-56.
85. See id.
86. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
87. Id. at 1506.
88. See id. at 1521.
89. Id.
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h. Primary Beneficiaries Are Lawyers and Investment Bankers
Finally, because many believed that these transactions had no real
economic benefits and merely involved the moving around of assets with
large transaction costs, the media often depicted lawyers and investment
bankers frequently as the main beneficiaries of these transactions.90
Harvard Professor Robert Reich wrote in 1989: “[i]nvestment bankers no
longer think of themselves as working for the corporations with which
they do business. These days, corporations seem to exist for the
investment bankers.”91
2. High Returns in the 1980s
While the media routinely criticized private equity firms, such firms
acquired enormous profits in the early 1980s.92 For early private equity
funds like Forstmann Little and KKR, “compounded annual rates of
return of [sixty] to [one hundred] percent were not uncommon.”93 In their
study of private equity returns, Steve Kaplan and Antoinette Schoar found
that funds with vintage years from 1983 to 1985 had internal rates of
returns of around thirty percent at the end of the fund’s lifetime.94 The
press also routinely featured stories of leveraged buyout transactions in
which investors reaped “hundreds of times their investments within a
couple of years.”95

90. See, e.g., Felix G. Rohatyn, On a Buyout Binge and a Takeover Tear, WALL ST.
J., May 18, 1984, at 26.
91. Robert B. Reich, Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
29, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/29/magazine/leveraged-buyouts-americanpays-the-price.html [https://perma.cc/SN3N-EV2F].
92. It is important to note that because “private equity investments are made via
partnerships,” no comprehensive data set of private equity returns exists. See R. McFall
Lamm, Jr. & Tanya E. Ghaleb-Harter, Private Equity as an Asset Class: Its Role in
Investment Portfolios, 4 J. PRIV. EQUITY 68, 72 (2001).
93. Thomas Boulton, Kenneth Lehn & Steven Segal, The Rise of the U.S. Private
Equity Market, in NEW FIN. INSTRUMENTS & INSTITUTIONS 141, 144 (Yasuyuki Fuchita
& Robert E. Litan, eds., 2007); Telephone Interview with Stephen Fraidin, Partner,
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP (May 11, 2018).
94. See Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 14, at 1802.
95. James Sterngold, Lure of Leveraged Buyouts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 1986),
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/08/business/lure-of-leveraged-buyouts.html [https://
perma.cc/NST2-QQXQ].

2019]

THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE EQUITY & THE
CHANGE IN GP COMPENSATION TERMS

339

C. MODERN PRIVATE EQUITY
The private equity industry today, however, looks quite different
than it did in the early 1980s. Not only is private equity much less
profitable, but also it is much less controversial. This section will detail
that change and explain how many of the factors that helped make private
equity more mainstream and acceptable simultaneously made private
equity less profitable.
1. Established Asset Class and Lower Returns
Although private equity firm returns generally have beaten the
market throughout their history—albeit, with some disagreement on
this96—private equity returns on average97 have declined substantially
since the early 1980s.98 Kaplan and Schoar found that, net-of-fees and
weighted by capital, the average returns of buyout funds with vintage
years after 1986 did not beat the S&P 500—except for funds started in
1990.99 A more recent paper by Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, and
Steven N. Kaplan, using a different dataset that did not extend to the early
1980s, found that while buyout funds generally have outperformed public
markets, the performance of buyout funds with “more recent vintages—
post-2005—have roughly equaled, not exceeded, the performance of
public markets.”100 In addition, several studies demonstrate that one of the
key factors propping up average private equity returns in the last decade
is the outsized performance of the top quartile of private equity firms.101
96. See Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, supra note 6, at 14; Higson & Stucke supra
note 15, at 2; Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 14, at 1792. But see Phalippou & Gottschalg,
supra note 14, at 1.
97. Private equity returns were high though in the early- to mid-1990s. See Harris,
Jenkinson, & Kaplan, supra note 6, at 33.
98. See, e.g., Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 14, at 1802; Hugh MacArthur, Graham
Elton, Daniel Haas & Suvir Varma, Private Equity Returns Still Outperform Public
Markets, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/baininsights/2017/03/
14/private-equity-returns-still-outperform-public-markets/#42e51f836553
[https://
perma.cc/Y5H6-65FT] (“Buyout returns have slowly trended downward.”).
99. See Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 14, at 1791-92; see also Phalippou &
Gottschalg, supra note 14, at 1756, 1774.
100. Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, supra note 6, at 21.
101. See Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, supra note 6, at 28; MacArthur, Elton, Haas &
Varma, supra note 98. Reported private equity returns also are criticized often as
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In a dataset analyzed by Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan, “over the 19942010 period, top (1st) quartile funds [had] average PMEs over two and a
half times those of the bottom (4th) quartile.”102
Moreover, as private equity returns declined after the early 1980s, so
did the stigma surrounding the industry. Today, private equity is a
celebrated investment strategy.103 The vast majority of investors hold a
positive view of private equity104 and every year top students compete for
spots at private equity funds.105 In addition, the fear that private equity
would lead to the demise of great American corporations and the U.S.
economy for the most part no longer exists.106 In fact, the beneficial
effects that debt can have on management and the reduction of agency
costs are now textbook in the business community.107 There are also

overstated. Return statistics frequently do not take account of the returns to private equity
investors during the period from the time they make the commitment until the time it is
invested. The returns instead are calculated based upon the post-investment results, even
though every private equity investor prudentially will set aside at least some portion of
their commitment so they can comply promptly to any call.
102. Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, supra note 6, at 28.
103. See Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, 85
HARV. BUS. REV. 53, 53 (2007).
104. See 2017 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 16.
105. See Portia Crowe, The Most Elite Students in America Have Had it With
Investment Banking, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/
harvard-mbas-dont-want-to-go-into-banking-anymore-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/AKF9GEVR]; William Alden, Private Equity Is Top Choice of Young Wall St. Bankers, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/private-equity-is-topchoice-of-young-wall-st-bankers/ [https://perma.cc/DWH3-G5R8].
106. See Jordan Weissmann, Is Private Equity Bad for the Economy?, ATLANTIC (Jan.
11, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/is-private-equity-badfor-the-economy/251245 [https://perma.cc/N5JK-DEK9].
107. See, e.g., SHINICHI HIROTA, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE IN
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY: BEYOND SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM 95 (2015) (“The
management of a debt-laden firm would make constant efforts to prevent bankruptcy. In
other words, debt issuance has an effect of raising the level of effort exerted by
management.”); MARKUS P. URBAN, THE INFLUENCE OF BLOCKHOLDERS ON AGENCY
COSTS AND FIRM VALUE 238 (Annette Köher et al. eds., 2015) (noting that leverage can
“create pressure on corporate management not to waste the firm’s cash flow and are
therefore said to have a disciplinary effect on management which ultimately reduces
managerial agency costs.”).

2019]

THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE EQUITY & THE
CHANGE IN GP COMPENSATION TERMS

341

countless articles and books that teach investors and CEOs important
lessons about value creation from private equity funds.108
What accounts for this transformation? Although there are numerous
reasons for it, some of those most significant involve changes that
occurred to the private equity industry in the mid- to late-1980s. Many of
these changes contributed to declining private equity returns, while
simultaneously improving private equity’s reputation. We will discuss
several of them in the next section.
2. Key Factors
Due to the high returns that private equity funds generated in the
early 1980s, more people wanted in on the action.109 As a result, the
number of private equity funds during the 1980s increased
dramatically.110 According to data from Preqin, there were only about
fourteen leveraged buyout funds in 1980.111 By 1989, there were eightyeight.112 Funds that already existed also increased as new investors such
as corporate and state pension funds and university endowments wanted
to invest.113 “From 1980 to 1995, the amount of capital under management
by the organized private equity market increased from roughly $4.7
billion to about $100 billion.”114 The Vice Chairman of Prudential
Insurance was quoted in 1986 as saying that “his only regret is that his

108. See, e.g., Barber & Goold, supra note 103, at 54; Andreas Beroutsos, Andrew
Freeman & Conor F. Kehoe, What Public Companies Can Learn From Private Equity,
MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2007), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/what-public-companies-can-learn-fromprivate-equity [https://perma.cc/A9JL-VLVJ].
109. See Jake Powers, The History of Private Equity & Venture Capital,
CORPORATELIVEWIRE (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.corporatelivewire.com/top-story
.html?id=the-history-of-private-equity-venture-capital [https://perma.cc/Q9V7-XXRK].
110. See id.
111. See E-mail from Caroline Teleisha, Client Services Executive, Preqin, to
Meredith Foster, Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Sept. 25, 2017, 4:41PM EST)
(on file with author).
112. See id.
113. See Sterngold, supra note 95.
114. GEORGE W. FENN, NELLIE LIANG & STEPHEN PROWSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 1 (Dec. 1995).
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company,” which had already invested $2 billion in leveraged buyouts,
had not invested more.115
While historical high returns were a principle driver of this increase
in both the number and size of private equity funds, another important
factor was the creation of an active high-yield debt market in the 1980s,
which, in effect, democratized debt.116 The high-yield bond market,
initially associated with Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham, gave
private equity funds access to affordable fixed rates of funding, which
lacked many of the restrictive covenants of bank loans and private
placements.117 The high-yield bond market also made credit available to
companies that were previously forced to finance their own activities,
without access to credit markets.118 As one character in the 2016 play Junk
states to another based on Michael Milken, “[b]efore you came along,
nobody did deals like this. I mean, to some of these blue bloods, these
aren’t even deals. Takeover is like a . . . four-letter word to them.”119
In sum, this “democratization of credit” meant that a totally
commercial credit market replaced the relationship—and reputationbased credit market that existed before junk bonds, and which made it
impossible for many to borrow the subordinated debt that is crucial to
private equity deals. The high-yield bond market also significantly
decreased the amount of time required to raise credit and, thus, to
complete a leveraged buyout.
This increase in competition and the amounts private equity funds
had under management put downward pressure on fund profitability. The
fund willing to pay the highest price and accept the lowest return
prevailed.120 In addition, because of the eagerness to participate and

115.
116.

See Sterngold, supra note 95.
See GLENN YAGO, JUNK BONDS: HOW HIGH YIELD SECURITIES RESTRUCTURED
CORPORATE AMERICA 25 (1991).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 23.
119. AYAD AKHTAR, JUNK: A PLAY act 1, 18 (2017).
120. See Boulton, Lehn & Segal, supra note 93, at 146 (“The rise in value of the stock
market, combined with the still increasing equity capital flowing to the established and
surviving LBO sponsors in the 1990s meant purchase prices, measured as a multiple of
EBITDA, began to rise significantly.”); Steven N. Kaplan & Jeremy C. Stein, The
Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s, 108 Q. J. ECON. 313,
345 (1993).
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invest, funds had to invest in less than optimal deals.121 While there were
only seventy-five buyouts with an aggregate of $1.3 billion in 1979, the
total value of buyouts by 1988 was $77 billion.122 Accordingly, private
equity investors generated smaller returns on their investments.
“Although target returns [had previously been in] the mid-30s percent
range, by the late 1990s, targeted returns had fallen to the mid- to low 20s,
and for the largest buyouts even the high teens.”123
Simultaneously, the growth of the private equity industry positively
affected its reputation. Because of the extraordinary returns in the early
1980s, universities and pension funds rushed to invest and soon became
some of the largest investors in private equity funds.124 During some
years, in fact, pension funds provided more than fifty percent of the
capital under management by private equity funds.125 Having received the
imprimatur of large, respected investors, private equity’s reputation as a
smart and acceptable investment strategy soon followed. As the
Economist writes: “Raise your money from the very wealthy and assetrich, and from institutions such as the pension funds of state governments
and municipal workers, sovereign-wealth funds and universities with
large endowments, and you get a certain clout.”126
Beyond a general increase in leveraged buyout activity, a number of
other significant changes occurred in the private equity industry during
the mid- to late-1980s. First, tax laws were less favorable. Previously,
121. See Boulton, Lehn & Segal, supra note 93, at 145; Kaplan & Stein, supra note
120, at 313.
122. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept.-Oct. 1989), https://hbr.org/1989/09/eclipse-of-the-public-corporation [https://
perma.cc/29DN-5QZ3].
123. Boulton, Lehn & Segal, supra note 93, at 146 (emphasis in original).
124. See These Investors Are Dominating Private Equity, INST. INV. (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1505qby1z03rr/these-investors-aredominating-private-equity [https://perma.cc/4E5J-5DGL]; PREQIN, NORTH AMERICAN
ENDOWMENTS AS INVESTORS IN PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 3 (2012), http://docs.preqin
.com/reports/US_Endowments_June_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV6A-YX6G].
125. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Wall St.’s Odd Couple and Their Question to Unlock
Riches, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:18 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/
wall-st-s-odd-couple-and-their-quest-to-unlock-riches/ [https://perma.cc/K27Q-D7MD].
126. Private Equity: The Barbarian Establishment, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21709007-private-equity-has-prosperedwhile-almost-every-other-approach-business-has-stumbled [https://perma.cc/P329-HG
GK].
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leveraged buyout funds carried three tax benefits: (1) the deductibility of
interest, (2) a stepped-up basis on a target’s assets, and (3) capital gains
treatment on the carried interest—or incentive compensation—enjoyed
by the managers.127 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 put a stop to the second
advantage.128 The Act required acquirers to realize gains on a target’s
assets at the time of distribution, thereby eliminating any economic
benefit to a step-up election.129
Around the same time, the jurisprudence in Delaware became less
favorable. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court, the most important
court with respect to corporate law in the United States, opined in four
separate decisions that:
(a) public companies that are the subject of hostile takeovers can take
extreme steps to fend off bidders;130
(b) those steps may include the issuance of a security—a poison
pill—that makes it impossible for a company to be acquired
without board approval;131
(c) if a company agrees to be acquired, it must engage in some form
of market check of the price;132 and
(d) if it is to be sold, it cannot provide any bidder with an advantage
in the bidding.133

One of these cases, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,134 involved private equity bidders. Two other cases, Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.135 and Smith v. Van Gorkom,136 involved transactions with
economic characteristics that resembled leveraged buyouts. The impact
of these cases: (1) makes it impossible for a private equity firm to make a
127. See Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of
Value, 44 J. FIN. 611, 611-13 (1989).
128. See id. at 612.
129. See id.
130. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 952 (Del. 1985).
131. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985).
132. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
133. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184
(Del. 1986).
134. See id.
135. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 952.
136. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 874.
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bargain purchase of a public company, (2) discourages public companies
from being sold, (3) empowers public companies to either remain
independent or to exercise bargaining power to raise their sale price to the
highest price reasonably attainable, and (4) makes it virtually impossible
for a hostile transaction to be effected.
As a result, established private equity firms, such as KKR,
Forstmann Little, and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, were on no better than
equal footing with everyone else, including the Drexel-sponsored raiders.
When a public company was to be sold, it effectively would be auctioned
to the highest bidder. In addition, because the target company no longer
had to fear a hostile transaction to the same extent, companies had
significantly less incentive to negotiate with potential buyers. All of this
made private equity less profitable.
Yet, while a less favorable legal regime had a negative effect on
private equity’s profitability, it helped bolster private equity’s
reputation.137 This less favorable legal regime helped to establish private
equity as a mode of investment that did not make money solely by
teaming up with management to prey on shareholders or by taking
advantage of U.S. tax laws.138 Instead, private equity funds could make a
profit by creating value for the companies they purchased.139 Late 1980s
academic literature also supported the view that private equity created
value. For example, Michael Jensen argued in the 1989 Harvard Business
Review that private equity would replace public equity as the “major
source of capital” for companies.140 He wrote: “By resolving the central
weakness of the public corporation—the conflict between owners and
managers over the control and use of corporate resources—these new
organizations are making remarkable gains in operating efficiency,
employee productivity, and shareholder value.”141

137. See Barber & Goold, supra note 103, at 53. See generally Brian Cheffins & John
Armour, Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2008).
138. See Barber & Goold, supra note 103, at 53-54.
139. See Mark Kovac, David Burns & Jason McLinn, How Private Equity Is Shifting
From Cost Cutting To Growth, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
baininsights/2018/04/09/how-private-equity-is-shifting-from-cost-cutting-to-growth/#7
c3538692a20 [https://perma.cc/SDC6-SX42].
140. Jensen, supra note 122.
141. Id.
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D. CHANGE IN PRIVATE EQUITY COMPENSATION TERMS
In sum, private equity after the mid-1980s became both less
profitable and more mainstream. While these were probably the two most
noticeable changes that the private equity industry underwent during this
time period, it also underwent another important change in the late 1980s:
the change in private equity manager compensation terms. This change
may seem insignificant compared to the other two changes, but it
fundamentally altered the incentives of private equity fund managers and
may have contributed to the decline in private equity returns.
1. Change in Calculation of Incentive Compensation
Originally, in the early 1980s, incentive compensation for fund
managers was calculated on a deal-by-deal basis.142 This meant that if a
fund made a profit of $1 million on its first two deals, the GPs would
collect $200,000 in incentive compensation from each transaction. While
this calculation of incentive compensation may not seem controversial in
the example given, it was controversial if a fund lost money on deals. GPs
would get the benefit of winners but would not be penalized for losers.143
For example, if a fund’s first deal produced a profit of $2 million and its
second deal resulted in a loss of $2 million of investor money, fund
managers would collect $400,000 in incentive compensation even though
the fund produced no returns for investors.
This was problematic in the eyes of LP investors for several reasons.
First, in many cases, GPs ultimately could receive more than twenty
percent of a fund’s returns in carried interest.144 For example, if the fund
had negative aggregate returns, the GP still would receive incentive
compensation as long as a few deals were profitable. The deal-by-deal
method of calculating carry also was believed to incentivize GPs to pursue
overly risky deals.145 If the fund made a lot of money, the GP benefited.146

142. See Ulf Axelson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, Why Are Buyouts
Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds, 64 J. FIN. 1549, 1570 n.20
(2009).
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1570-71.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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If it lost money, the GP’s losses were small, if any.147 This advantage to
GPs stood in stark contrast to LPs who had to bear both the benefit of
gains and the burden of losses from risky deals.148 Third, many argued
that the deal-by-deal method of calculating incentive compensation
created incentives for GPs to immediately abandon—or pay less attention
to—losing deals and move on to dedicate their time and energy to
profitable ones.149 Again, this method of calculating incentive
compensation resulted in a misalignment of incentives between GPs and
LPs. LPs may, under certain circumstances, prefer that a fund dedicate
time to mitigating losses, rather than focusing solely on future profits.
Finally, the deal-by-deal method of calculating carried interest
seemed fundamentally unfair for private equity managers to profit,
sometimes handsomely, from one or two successful deals, while the fund
itself and the investors suffered losses. Further, highly publicized displays
of personal wealth by some private equity managers—private jets, lavish
parties, mansions, etc.—did not sit well with institutional investors whose
managers typically received more modest compensation.150
Because of these various issues, deal-by-deal carried interest fell out
of favor by the 1990s and became virtually nonexistent in limited
partnership agreements.151 An aggregation, or netting, method of
calculating carried interest replaced the deal-by-deal method of
calculating carried interest.152 Under the aggregation method, returns on
each deal in a fund are netted against one another and, as a result, the fund
manager is only able to collect twenty percent of the final aggregate
returns of the fund, subject to a hurdle rate. This means that if a fund
pursues two deals, one making a profit of $1 million and the other losing
$1 million, the fund manager will have no carried interest. This method
was, and is still is, applauded for removing the option-like aspect of the
former incentive compensation fee structure and for mitigating GP
incentives to maximize volatility.153

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.
See id.
See MERCER, supra note 16, at 7.
This is based on the authors’ personal observations and experience.
See id.; Axelson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 142, at 1570 n.20.
See MERCER, supra note 16, at 7.
LOWELL MILKEN INST. BUS. L. & POL’Y, UCLA SCH. L., DOES “TWO
TWENTY” HAVE A FUTURE?, PRIVATE FUND: 2017 REPORT 6 (2017).
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One key factor that led to the adoption of the aggregation approach
was the change in the nature of private equity fund investors. At the time
of the deal-by-deal carried interest provisions, early private equity fund
investors were wealthy individuals and family offices.154 While such
investors were financially sophisticated, they were not organized as such
because they typically did not consult among themselves or with legal
counsel regarding compensation terms.155 Furthermore, many believed
that reputation, far more than terms, was the most important factor in
determining whether a private equity fund was worth investing in.156
Theoretically, a manager could ignore a losing business, but it did so at
the peril of its reputation.
By the mid-1980s, however, institutional investors, such as state and
corporate pension funds and university endowments, had “significant
portions of capital” in private equity funds.157 Since their decision to
invest was less personal than the wealthy individuals and family office
investors of the past, GP compensation terms became more important than
a GP’s reputation. Moreover, these professional investors communicated
with each other regarding terms and if something went amiss—for
example, if a losing investment resulted in the manager being nevertheless
well-compensated—the investor was subject to serious criticism from its
own clients. It was in this context, in conjunction with a belief among LPs
that the aggregation method was fairer, that the change in compensation
terms came about.
II. THE UNINTENDED EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN PRIVATE EQUITY
COMPENSATION TERMS
Despite the universally positive reception of the change in private
equity compensation terms, the newly-adopted aggregation method had a
more nuanced effect on the private equity industry than has been
portrayed. While private equity funds adopted the aggregation method to
be fairer to LPs, it may not have been in their interest. This part will
discuss three possibly negative consequences of the move to the
aggregation method for LPs: (1) it created new agency costs between LPs
154. THOMAS MEYER, PRIVATE EQUITY UNCHAINED: STRATEGY INSIGHTS FOR THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 13 (2014).
155. This is based on the authors’ personal observations.
156. See MEYER, supra note 154, at 69.
157.
HARRY CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND
OPERATION 6 (2nd ed. 2012).
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and GPs, (2) it negatively affected the ability of poorly performing funds
to retain and hire talented investment professionals, and (3) it coincided
with an increase in the portion of GP compensation that came from fixed
compensation provisions. We argue that many of the consequences of
moving to the aggregation method were unfavorable for LPs and may
have contributed to declining private equity returns.
A. ALTERED INCENTIVES
Although the aggregation method was designed to reduce agency
costs, it inadvertently created new ones. As mentioned, the aggregation
method aligns GP and LP interests when a fund is doing well. The fund
manager is compensated when LPs make money, and loses money when
LPs lose money. Yet, while the aggregation method aligns incentives
when the fund is doing well, it does not work as well when the fund’s
returns are below the hurdle rate, particularly by a large margin. In such
a case, the GP is no longer compensated for modestly performing deals
and is not punished when deals lose the fund money. As a result, as long
as the fund is below its hurdle rate, a GP is incentivized to enter into deals
with large amounts of risk.158 It is only by taking on a lot of risk with the
ability to generate high returns that the fund’s returns can possibly get
back over the eight-percent hurdle rate and the GP can start receiving
incentive compensation again. Moreover, if the fund loses a lot of money
from a risky deal, the fund manager is no worse off, still receiving zero in
incentive compensation.
On the other hand, this misalignment of interests between LPs and
GPs when a fund is below its hurdle rate is not as extreme in a fund with
a deal-by-deal method of calculating carried interest. Under the deal-bydeal method, a GP whose fund has negative aggregate returns may still be
incentivized to enter into a new transaction with the same investment
characteristics as a GP whose fund has positive aggregate returns. In other
words, the GP with a poorly performing fund will not be affected by the
need to generate extraordinarily high returns and, therefore, is just as
likely to engage in a deal with good but not fantastic returns. As long as
the good, but less risky, deal has the promise of generating returns of
above eight percent—a much easier hurdle rate to achieve than the one
that exists when returns are aggregated across deals—its expected return
to the GP may be higher than the expected return of the risky deal. That
158.

See Harris, supra note 23, at 285.
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is to say, when a fund is below its hurdle rate, interests actually may be
better aligned under the deal-by-deal method of calculating incentive
compensation and the fund manager may have less incentive to take on
too much risk.
While these agency costs only appear when a fund is below its hurdle
rate, this set of circumstances is not infrequent. In fact, it is more common
than it was in the 1990s when private equity funds started calculating
carried interest by netting returns across deals.159 When funds were
making twenty- to thirty-percent returns in the early 1980s,160 they would
almost never be below their hurdle rates and, thus, the aggregation method
largely would align the interests of LPs and GPs. As a fund made money,
both parties made money, and when it lost money, both parties lost
money. Yet, as fund returns have decreased significantly, particularly
among the bottom seventy-fifth percentile, private equity funds are likely
to struggle to meet their hurdle rates.161
Another fact about the private equity industry today that highlights
agency costs of the aggregation method is that private equity funds
frequently invest in deals, and make important decisions about those
deals, after they have a sense of how prior deals have performed.162 If
funds only made investments at around the same time—typically, early in
the life of the fund—then we would not expect to see a misalignment of
incentives between LPs and GPs under the aggregation method of
calculating carried interest. All private equity funds would make all
investment decisions before the fund suffered losses on prior deals—or at
least suspected they will suffer losses—and is below its hurdle rate.
In reality, however, while funds may invest the majority of their
capital at around the same time,163 many, if not most, invest in subsequent
deals sequentially. There can be five to six years between a fund’s first

159. Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating
the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 115, 131-32 (2008).
160. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., PREQIN, FUND PROFILE – 3G SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND IV 2 (2019)
(demonstrating that 3G Special Situations Fund IV conducted a $40 billion transaction in
2014 and then a $200 million dollar one in 2018).
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and last deals.164 The investment period of a private equity fund, i.e., the
time during which the private equity fund can make investments in new
companies, is about five years on average, although it varies from fund to
fund.165 Over this five-year time period, the private equity fund makes
multiple investments. For example, Blackstone Capital Partners V,
founded in 2006 and, which closed with about $21 billion under
management, initiated dozens of investments from 2006 to 2012.166
Moreover, the average number of years from investment to exit
historically has been around three to five.167 What this means is that a fund
will have already cashed out on some of its first deals and has a good
sense of how profitable some of its others are likely to be by the time it
makes its later investments. The fund therefore will know based on prior
deals whether it is likely to be above or below its hurdle rate, which will
affect whether it wants to take on more or less risk under the aggregation
method.
In this way, although the aggregation method of calculating carried
interest may have reduced some of the GP’s agency costs, it likely has
exacerbated others. These agency costs are particularly extreme today
when private equity funds are frequently below their hurdle rates. If a fund
has lost money and is below its hurdle rate after early investments, the
managers will be incentivized to invest in transactions that may have
different risk-reward characteristics than if their early investments had
made money. While this does not necessarily mean that LPs should
abandon the aggregation method of calculating carried interest, it also
indicates that the belief prevalent in the 1980s, and still prevalent today,

164. See, e.g., PREQIN, FUND PROFILE – 3G SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND II 2 (2019)
(demonstrating that 3G Special Situations Fund II made three buyout transactions, one in
2010, one in 2014, and one in 2017). This is also based on the authors’ personal
observations and experience.
165. See DAVID P. STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE
EQUITY 320 (2nd ed. 2012).
166. See PREQIN, FUND PROFILE – BLACKSTONE CAPITAL PARTNERS V 3 (2019)
[hereinafter FUND PROFILE – BLACKSTONE CAPITAL PARTNERS V].
167. See Buyout Holding Periods, PREQIN, May 2015, at 7, http://docs.preqin.com/
newsletters/pe/Preqin-PESL-May-15-Buyout-Holding-Periods.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y
M7U-5JXP]; Hugh MacArthur, Graham Elton & Suvir Varma, Exits Settle at a New
Normal in Private Equity, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bain
insights/2017/03/09/exits-settle-at-a-new-normal-in-private-equity/#810763b6b37f [http
s://perma.cc/5XMK-QNZD].
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that the aggregation method better aligns LP and GP interests may, in fact,
be false.168
B. EFFECT ON GENERAL PARTNER HIRING AND RETENTION OF TALENT
In addition to creating new agency costs between LPs and GPs,
another problem with the aggregation method that has been ignored is the
negative effect that it can have on the internal structure of the manager.
Private equity employees are, unsurprisingly, like most employees in the
finance industry—highly motivated by compensation in making decisions

168. One potential response to the argument that the aggregation method creates
problematic incentives for GPs is that compensation terms do not need to perfectly align
GP and LP incentives. Reputation, based on a GP’s prior performance, sufficiently
motivates GPs to pursue what is in LPs’ best interests. The more money the GP loses for
investors, the worse the reputation of the GP among its peers and there is an economic
incentive to have a good reputation. A good reputation helps fund managers raise more
money from LPs for future funds, resulting in a larger management fee. In other words,
according to this argument, “[m]anagers with good reputations are able to raise
subsequent funds from the current crop of investors, and perhaps convince new investors
to shift resources.” Harris, supra note 23, at 288-89. Because reputation alone sufficiently
incentivizes GPs to pursue the interests of LPs, the goal of compensating GPs should
instead be primarily to avoid overcompensation, which the aggregation method does by
netting losing deals against winning ones.
There is one reason, however, why this counterargument is likely wrong and why
compensation provisions are necessary to align LP and GP interests. Even if past fund
performance is a good predictor of a fund manager’s ability to raise a follow-on fund,
one would not expect the reputational incentives of GPs when they are below their hurdle
rates to be aligned with LPs. That is because, as long as only top performing funds are
able to raise follow on funds (which is generally true), it does not matter to GPs whether
they are slightly below the hurdle rate or significantly below their hurdle rate. Either way,
they will have a negative reputation and, as a result, a hard time raising money for their
next fund. GPs therefore will be incentivized, based on reputation alone, to take on lots
of risk in order to have the possibility of surpassing their hurdle rate and entering the
ranks of top performing funds. Only by entering the ranks of top performing funds do
they have a chance of successfully raising follow-on funds.
The reputational incentives when funds are performing poorly therefore do not align GP
and LP interests and certainly do not counteract the agency costs of the aggregation
method of calculating incentive compensation. Instead, the agency costs that exist under
the aggregation method when funds are at or below their hurdle rates may be exacerbated
by GPs’ reputational incentives.
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about whether to stay at or leave a job.169 They are paid partially based on
a flat fee and, to a much greater extent, through a bonus tied in part to
individual performance and to the incentive compensation received by the
GPs. Lower level private equity employees such as associates and senior
associates in the United States receive on average about “$66.2k and
$145.9k respectively in carried interest.”170
Because private equity employees expect to share in the incentive
compensation of a fund, early poor investments by the private equity fund
can have a profoundly negative impact on the fund’s ability to retain and
hire talented investment professionals under the aggregation method. If it
becomes unlikely that the fund will make anything from incentive
compensation, employees will realize that they will have to work for the
rest of the life of the fund without the opportunity to share in the
performance-based pay. As a result, instead of sticking around and
helping the fund improve its relative returns, they may search for jobs at
other funds. The aggregation method of calculating carried interest may
therefore result in the fund’s inability to retain key talent at a time when
the need is greatest. The same argument applies to being able to hire new
talent when the fund is below its hurdle rate. Talented employees are
unlikely to join a fund that is already substantially below its hurdle rate
and where they are less likely to receive incentive compensation from
future successful deals.
The problem of not being able to hire or retain new talent when a
fund performed poorly does not exist to the same extent if the fund uses
the deal-by-deal method of calculating carried interest. Prior poor
investment decisions have no effect on whether investment professionals
will receive a portion of incentive compensation on future successful
deals. As a result, the possibility of investment professionals leaving in
response to a few early bad deals and the subsequent difficulty replacing
them with equal talent should not necessarily exist.

169. See BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE
POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUITY 62
(2017).
170. Paul Clarke, What to Expect for Your Private Equity Salary, Bonus And Carried
Interest in the U.S., Europe And Asia, EFINANCIALCAREERS (Nov. 7, 2017), https://news.e
financialcareers.com/us-en/225363/heres-how-much-youll-be-paid-in-private-equity/
[https://perma.cc/KY56-VDY2].
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C. INCREASE IN FIXED PORTION OF COMPENSATION
Another effect of this change in calculating carry interest is that, as
GPs made less on average in incentive compensation, their fixed
compensation became more important.171 In part, this fact is just a
function of math. As GPs made less in incentive compensation, fixed
compensation components made up a larger fraction of total
compensation.172 Around the same time, funds also began to increase their
assets under management, thereby exacerbating the effect. “From 1980 to
1995, the amount of capital under management by the organized private
equity market increased from roughly $4.7 billion to over $175 billion”173
and the average U.S. buyout fund size increased dramatically over time.174
As the amounts under management grew, the two-percent management
fee became an increasing percentage of GP compensation. A recent
empirical study by Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda found that, among
their sample private equity funds, “about two-thirds of expected revenue
comes from fixed-revenue components that are not sensitive to
performance.”175
That the majority of expected revenue now comes from fixedrevenue components demonstrates that, as the amount fund managers
could make through incentive compensation decreased, fund managers
found new ways to make money. They did so primarily by increasing the
amount under management and generating higher management fees.176
They also increasingly included new fees in their limited partnership
agreements with LPs, such as transaction and monitoring fees, which
were not directly tied to the returns of the fund.177
The increased role of fixed compensation in GP pay is problematic
for LPs for several reasons. Importantly, it means that a key historical

171.
172.
173.

See infra notes 175-79.
See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 19, at 2312-13.
George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, & Stephen Prowse, The Private Equity Market:
An Overview, 6 FIN. MKTS., INSTITUTIONS, & INSTRUMENTS 1, 2 (1997).
174. See FRASER-SAMPSON, supra note 24, at 71.
175. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 19, at 2303.
176. See id. at 2309.
177. See id. at 2313, 2319-20; Ludovic Phalippou, Christian Rauch & Marc Umber,
Private Equity Portfolio Company Fees (Apr. 5, 2016), http://privatecapital.unc.edu/
PrivateEquity2016/files/Phalippou-PrivateEquityPortfolioCompanyFeesShort.pdf [https
://perma.cc/6CN5-KG92].
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feature of GP compensation—that it creates high-powered incentives for
fund managers to perform—no longer exists.178 Now, GPs can make large
sums of money just by managing large sums of money. For LPs, this is
problematic; the more money a fund has under management, the more
GPs will struggle to find optimal investment opportunities.179 Moreover,
“the need to put large amounts of capital to work can [] compromise
operational standards.”180 Private equity funds operate through intense
due diligence and active management of their portfolio companies. Both
of these activities become more difficult when the portfolio of
investments held by a private equity fund increases.
Another result of the increasing role of fixed compensation is that
carry’s role in aligning GP and LP incentives has been compromised.
“The classic Private Equity fund economic model (certainly the
theoretical ideal) is for the GPs to be motivated by carry . . . In very
simplified terms, this is an essential element of what you often hear
referred to as ‘alignment of interests in the GP/LP relationship.’”181 Yet,
as long as GPs are compensated primarily through management fees, GP
incentives will be, at best, only loosely aligned with LP incentives.
D. THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS
The above demonstrates that, contrary to general belief, the adoption
of the aggregation method has had several negative effects for LPs. The
aggregation method is arguably worse in aligning GP and LP interests
than the deal-by-deal method of carried interest due to the agency costs it
creates when a fund is doing poorly. It also has a negative effect on the
fund’s internal management when it is below its hurdle rate and coincides
with an increase in the importance of fixed portions of compensation.
While private equity compensation terms were known previously to
178. See THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J CURVE:
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 32 (2005)
(“Despite major changes in the private equity industry over various cycles, it remains
largely uncontested that the fund managers’ main incentive is performance-based through
carried interest.”).
179. See Klaas P. Baks & Lawrence M. Benveniste, Alignment of Interest in the
Private Equity Industry, EMORY CTR. ALT. INV. (July 2010), https://goizueta.emory.edu/
faculty/cai/documents/ecai_alignment.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7TY-JTT4].
180. MEYER, supra note 154, at 56.
181. FRASER-SAMPSON, supra note 24, at 76.
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create substantial incentives for performance, the large majority of private
equity compensation now comes from fixed terms that have nothing to do
with performance.
In addition, there is some evidence that these new agency costs may
have contributed to declining private equity returns based on a recent
empirical study conducted by Niklas Huther, David Robinson, Sonke
Sievers, and Thomas Hartmann-Wendels.182 The study analyzed two
contractual approaches to determine the timing of carried interest in LP
agreements: deal-by-deal carried interest provisions (“GP-friendly”)
versus fund-as-a-whole carried interest provisions (“LP-friendly”).183
Unlike the aggregation versus deal-by-deal carried interest provisions,
which determine the calculation of carried interest and which are the
subject of this paper, the provisions that Huther, Robinson, Sievers, and
Hartmann-Wendels analyze merely determine the timing of carried
interest payments.184 In both cases, carried interest is calculated by
aggregating returns across deals.185
After examining these two contractual provisions, the authors then
ask: are limited partners better off with LP-friendly contracts? They find,
based on analyzing data from eighty-five U.S. venture funds, that LPs are
not better off on average with LP-friendly contracts.186 Instead, GPfriendly contracts are associated with better performance on both a grossand net-of-fee basis.187 They attribute this correlation between GPfriendly contracts and higher LP-returns to two factors. First, better
quality private equity firms are able to extract better deal terms.188 Second,
fund-as-a-whole carried interest provisions create worse incentives for
private equity managers.189 Such incentives are created by the fact that
while managers “under deal-by-deal contracts” act “under an incentive to
maximize the value of each exit irrespective of how it is connected to the
182. See Niklas Huther, David Robinson, Sonke Sievers & Thomas HartmannWendels, Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from VC Partnerships, 3,
SSRN (Dec. 13, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087320
[https://perma.cc/3YMW-3RCA].
183. See id. at 3-6.
184. See id. at 2-3.
185. See id. at 1.
186. See id. at 3.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 4.
189. See id. at 4-6.
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broader portfolio they manage,”190 managers under fund-as-a-whole
carried interest contracts manage returns in relation to the broader
portfolio. In light of this, managers with fund-as-a-whole carried interest
contracts often have a tendency to exit deals too early and engage in less
risk-taking upfront, but increase their risk-taking over the life of the
fund.191 They also note that under fund-as-a-whole carried interest
contracts, GPs “seem to be less motivated to exert effort conditional on
poorly performing previous exits.”192
While this study does not deal with the calculation of carried interest,
its findings are nonetheless relevant to evaluating the move from deal-bydeal calculations of carried interest to the aggregation method. In
particular, many of the incentives that the fund-as-a-whole carried interest
timing provision creates—that the authors argue may have led to smaller
private equity returns—are present to an even greater extent in the
aggregation method of calculating carried interest. This is because the
aggregation method of calculating carried interest, like the fund-as-awhole carried interest provision, requires an evaluation of the returns of
investments in relation to the returns of the entire portfolio, which affect
what types of risk a GP is willing to take on and when. Moreover, the
problematic incentives, for example, that exist under the fund-as-a-whole
carried interest timing provisions when the fund has “poorly performing
previous exits” we would expect, in light of the argument in Part II.A, to
be even more extreme when carried interest is calculated on an aggregate
instead of a deal-by-deal basis.193
Therefore, while far from definitive, the study’s findings indicate
that the change in the calculation of carried interest may have contributed
to lower private equity returns.
III. REVISING GENERAL PARTNER COMPENSATION TERMS
The discussion in Part II demonstrates that the change in how private
equity funds calculated carry in the 1980s, while universally celebrated,
had a number of negative effects on the private equity industry. Moreover,
these negative effects are especially troubling today, when private equity
fund returns have declined substantially. In these circumstances, the
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 22.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 29.
See id.
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existing GP compensation structure may align GP and LP interests only
infrequently.
This raises the following question: is there a way to rewrite GP
compensation terms to reduce these existing agency costs? We suggest
two possible ways that GP-LP agreements could be rewritten to decrease
existing agency costs: (1) revert to calculating carry on a deal-by-deal
basis, while compensating investors, such as the LPs, for that change by
reducing the percentage of profits GPs would receive from each deal; and
(2) decrease or eliminate the hurdle rate. These proposals are not meant
to be exhaustive, but instead provide two ways to mitigate the agency
costs under the aggregation method of calculating carried interest.
A. CALCULATING CARRIED INTEREST ON A DEAL-BY-DEAL BASIS
The most obvious way to avoid several problems that result from the
aggregation method of calculating carry would be for funds, in the future,
to return to calculating carry on a deal-by-deal basis. As long as funds
calculate carry on a deal-by-deal basis, some of the problems, such as the
incentives for GPs to take on too much risk when the fund is below its
hurdle rate, would not, as explained above, exist to the same extent.
Moreover, to ensure that LPs are compensated for this change and to
prevent a dramatic increase in GP compensation, the percentage of the
total profits that GPs would receive in carry could be reduced. Generally,
in a fund that calculates carried interest using the aggregation method,
GPs, as explained above, receive twenty percent of the overall profits of
the fund. If, however, GPs were compensated on a deal-by-deal basis, LPs
could require or request that GPs only receive ten or fifteen percent carry
on each deal.
Yet, even if private equity funds reduced GP carried interest
percentages, there are some obvious downsides of returning to the dealby-deal method of calculating carry. As mentioned, the deal-by-deal
method creates many of its own agency costs. Therefore, before returning
to deal-by-deal carry provisions, LPs will need to weigh the agency costs
of each against one another. Contrary to popular opinion, the results of
this weighing are not clear-cut and demand a nuanced understanding of
the incentives created by each carry provision and how they interact with
the incentives created by other factors such as GP reputation. For
example, the reputational incentives of fund managers when a fund is
doing well may already do a good job of aligning GP and LP interests
and, therefore, GP compensation primarily should aim to align incentives
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when the fund is doing badly. Further empirical research regarding
whether the aggregation method of calculating carry actually results in
lower overall fund returns would also be informative.
In addition, in considering this proposal, LPs will have to determine
how much they value not overcompensating GPs relative to creating the
right incentives for GPs. The deal-by-deal method of calculating carried
interest inherently risks overpaying GPs. Even if GP carry percentages
were reduced and GP compensation on average decreased, individual GPs
could still receive performance-based compensation even if the LPs
themselves make no money.
B. REMOVING OR DECREASING THE HURDLE RATE
Even if funds do not start calculating carry on a deal-by-deal basis,
there are other ways to mitigate some of the problems created by the
aggregation method of calculating carry. One way is for a fund to continue
to calculate carry based on the aggregation method, but to eliminate the
hurdle rate or replace it with a lower preferred return.
Hurdle rates, as mentioned, generally require that fund managers
meet certain performance targets (e.g., eight percent per annum) before
they can collect anything in incentive compensation.194 Hurdle rates pose
serious problems for funds that calculate carry by netting returns across
deals because, as long as a fund’s first few deals put it substantially below
its hurdle rate, GPs may be incentivized to take on too much risk in future
deals in order to possibly start getting paid carried interest again.
Moreover, the higher the hurdle rate, the more likely the fund returns are
to be below it and the greater the risk-taking incentives of GPs will be.
Eliminating or decreasing the hurdle rate would mitigate, but not
eliminate, GP incentives to take on too much risk, and a GP’s ability to
retain and hire talent when the fund is below its hurdle rate would not
exist to the same degree. This is because the lower the hurdle fee, the
more likely a fund manager will be close to or above it. And as long as a
fund is close to or above its hurdle rate, receiving carried interest on future
successful deals (even if they do not make enormous returns) will be more
likely. As a result, employees will not have to fear that they will only

194. See Ludovic Phalippou, Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 147, 155 (2009); Will Kenton, Hurdle Rate, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hurdlerate.asp [https://perma.cc/F83A-VRNF].
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receive a salary (and nothing in incentive compensation) for their work
on these deals.
It is important to note, however, that decreasing or eliminating the
hurdle rate would only alleviate the negative effects, not eliminate them
entirely. Even if the fund had no hurdle rate, its aggregate returns could
still be negative. If that were true, then a GP still may need to engage in
overly risky deals to have the possibility of surpassing the hurdle rate.
Depending on how negative the returns are, the GP could have trouble
holding onto and hiring talented employees. In other words, while
eliminating or reducing the hurdle rate helps mitigate these costs of the
aggregation method, it does not get rid of them.
Unlike the proposal that funds return to calculating carry on a dealby-deal basis, this proposal is not as extreme and, in fact, has some
traction already in the private equity industry. In recent years, some funds
“have broken convention” by charging a lower hurdle rate or removing it
entirely.195 Forbes reported in March of 2017:
CVC [planned] a hurdle rate of 6% for its Fund VII, compared with
the industry standard of 8%. Advent International removed the hurdle
rate outright from its latest fund, which closed on $13 billion, although
that decision was offset somewhat by the fund’s switch to the more
LP-friendly European waterfall structure.196

Yet, these examples of funds decreasing or eliminating their hurdle
rates hardly represent the norm. In 2016, Preqin reported that only thirteen
percent of private capital funds do not have hurdle rates and that twentytwo percent have hurdle rates of greater than eight percent.197
CONCLUSION
Private equity today looks very different than it did in the early
1980s. This paper started by documenting two of the most important
changes that occurred to the private equity industry during mid- to late195. See Hugh MacArthur, Graham Elton, Daniel Haas & Suvir Varma, As Good as
It Gets for Private Equity Fund-Raising, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/baininsights/2017/03/10/as-good-as-it-gets-for-private-equity-fundraising/#271ae0ee71d4 [https://perma.cc/H7ZE-VJ57].
196. Id.
197. See PREQIN, PRIVATE CAPITAL FUND TERMS 9 (2016), http://docs.preqin.com/
reports/Preqin-Special-Report-Private-Capital-Fund-Terms-November-2016.pdf [https
://perma.cc/6HZK-UDCV].
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1980s: it transformed from a highly profitable and highly controversial
investment strategy in the early 1980s to a much less profitable and
controversial trillion-dollar industry. Yet, in addition to these two very
public changes, private equity also underwent another important, but
often ignored, change in the late 1980s: GP compensation terms were
rewritten to better align GP and LP interests—the most important being
the change from calculating carried interest on a deal-by-deal basis to an
aggregation basis.
This paper argued that the latter change, which private equity funds
adopted with the intention of reducing agency costs between LPs and
GPs, inadvertently created new, arguably worse agency costs and may
have contributed to declining private equity returns. Moreover, the
change in GP compensation terms likely had a negative impact on a
fund’s ability to retain and hire new talent when the fund performs poorly.
Additionally, the fixed portion of GP compensation increased in
importance. In light of these problems with the aggregation method of
calculating carried interest, this paper ended by exploring two potential
ways to mitigate these problems: (1) returning to a deal-by-deal method
of calculating carried interest, and (2) decreasing or eliminating a fund’s
hurdle rates.
This paper also hopes to shed light on GP compensation terms more
generally—particularly those designed to make GP terms fairer to LPs. In
recent years, there have been several proposals to change GP
compensation terms to make them fairer. Some of them seem
unequivocally positive, such as requiring that transaction fees flow
through to the LPs.198 Other proposals, however, such as the netting of
returns across funds,199 are more complicated. Yet, despite the fact that
such proposals would quite clearly have both benefits and downsides, the
downsides largely have been ignored. Instead, people have focused
almost solely on their potential to superficially benefit LPs. This onesided approach is problematic for several reasons, not the least of which
is that it may result in LPs bargaining for changes in GP compensation
that may not actually be in their best interests.

198. See Albert J. Hudec, Negotiating Private Equity Fund Terms: The Shifting
Balance of Power, 19 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2 (2010).
199. See Jarrod Shobe, Misaligned Interests in Private Equity, 2016 BYU L. REV.
1437, 1471 (2017).

